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NOTE
THE CASE AGAINST COMBATING BITTORRENT
PIRACY THROUGH MASS JOHN DOE COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS
Sean B. Karunaratne*
Today, the most popular peer-to-peer file-sharing medium is the BitTorrent
protocol. While BitTorrent itself is not illegal, many of its users unlawfully
distribute copyrighted works. Some copyright holders enforce their rights
by suing numerous infringing BitTorrent users in a single mass lawsuit.
Because the copyright holder initially knows the putative defendants only
by their IP addresses, it identifies the defendants anonymously in the com-
plaint as John Does. The copyright holder then seeks a federal court's
permission to engage in early discovery for the purpose of learning the
identities behind the IP addresses. Once the plaintiff knows the identities of
the John Does, it contacts them with a settlement demand. But often before
such discovery is granted, the anonymous defendants have been improper-
ly joined, and the lawsuit has been filed in a court that lacks personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. This presents no problem to the plaintiff
because the plaintiff does not intend for the lawsuit to go to trial. However
the defendants effectively have no choice but to succumb to the plaintiff's
settlement demand because settling will be less costly than fighting the ac-
tion. This Note argues that courts should not grant expedited discovery in
such procedurally deficient lawsuits. To rein in these mass lawsuits, this
Note argues that mass copyright infringement suits should meet certain
minimum joinder and personal jurisdiction requirements before courts
grant expedited discovery.
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INTRODUCTION
This year, thousands of alleged users' of the BitTorrent peer-to-peer file
-sharing protocol will open their mailboxes to an unwelcome surprise: a
letter from a copyright holder threatening to sue the user for copyright in-
fringement unless he pays a specified settlement amount.2 The recipient will
receive the letter because he is one of the several anonymous John Doe de-
fendants joined in a single mass copyright infringement lawsuit that
identifies the defendants only by the IP addresses associated with their in-
ternet accounts. 3 In their continuing assault against online piracy, copyright
holders are using this mass litigation tactic to prosecute alleged infringers.
Since mid-2010, over 220,000 BitTorrent users have been targeted in this
manner.
4
The litigation strategy is simple. The plaintiff-copyright holder issues a
complaint alleging that all the listed John Does have used BitTorrent to in-
fringe its copyright. 5 Then the plaintiff moves for expedited discovery on the
basis of that complaint. Expedited discovery allows the plaintiff to serve
1. Not all individuals implicated in these lawsuits are actual BitTorrent users. There
are a number of cases of mistaken identity in which the person whose account was associated
with the IP address was not the person who allegedly infringed upon the copyrighted work.
For an example of a situation in which a subsequently identified John Doe was in all likeli-
hood not the one who downloaded the copyrighted work, see James Temple, Wrongfully
Targeted? Lawsuit Says Grandma Illegally Downloaded Porn, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 2011, at
DI (settlement letter sent to a seventy-year-old grandmother).
2. Cindy Cohn, Mass Copyright Litigation: New Challenge for the Federal Courts,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/mass-
copyright-litigation-new-challenge-federal; see also Letter from John L. Steele, Attorney,
Steele Hansmeier, PLLC, to John Doe Defendant (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Steele Letter],
available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/zPersonal/AJohnson/
110719_SteeleHansmeierSettlementLetter.pdf (example of a letter sent to a John Doe
defendant).
3. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Third
Party Time Warner Cable's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena at 1, Third World Media
LLC v. Does 1-1243, No. 3:10-cv-0090, (N.D. W. Va. Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Memoran-
dum of Amicus Curiae], available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/wvcopyrighttroll/
thirdworldmediavdoesamicus.PDF.
4. Jason Koebler, Porn Companies File Mass Piracy Lawsuits: Are You at Risk?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2012/02/02/pom-companies-file-mass-piracy-lawsuits-are-you-at-risk.
5. Technically, John Does do not officially become defendants until they are identified
and named to the case. This Note will sometimes use the term "defendants" when referring to
John Does as shorthand for "putative defendants."
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subpoenas on each Doe's Internet Service Provider ("ISP") in order to un-
cover the identity behind each Doe's Internet Protocol ("IP") 6 address.
Obtaining the Does' identities is the copyright holders' ultimate goal be-
cause they never intend to litigate these mass lawsuits.7 Instead, settlement
is their endgame.
After obtaining the identities of the previously anonymous John Does,
the copyright holder sends settlement letters to the defendants notifying
them that they will be named in the suit if they do not pay a specified
amount. The settlement offer is carefully designed to leave the defendant
with no choice but to settle, even when he has a strong defense to the ac-
tion.8 The pressure to settle is especially acute when the copyrighted work in
question is a pornographic video, as is often the case.9
The John Does' inability to defend themselves is particularly troubling
because many do have strong defenses, given the major procedural defects
that typically plague these lawsuits." ° In particular, these mass lawsuits suf-
fer from improper joinder and the forum court's lack of personal jurisdiction
over many (if not most) of the defendants." When those issues are raised,
district courts split on whether to allow discovery of the anonymous defend-
ants' identities. 12
This Note argues that, because these mass John Doe copyright infringe-
ment lawsuits frequently suffer from major procedural deficiencies, federal
district court judges should not grant expedited discovery without carefully
investigating whether the John Doe defendants have been properly joined
and without first ensuring that the court has personal jurisdiction over them.
Part I traces the history of mass copyright infringement actions against
online file sharers and explains how the unique nature of BitTorrent differ-
entiates it from the peer-to-peer networks involved in previous mass
lawsuits. Part II advocates for the imposition of minimum joinder and per-
sonal jurisdiction requirements that courts should enforce prior to granting
expedited discovery. Part III contends that mass lawsuits impermissibly take
procedural shortcuts as part of a low-cost, high-volume litigation strategy
designed to obtain the defendants' identities and coerce settlements and
6. The IP address is a numerical key that identifies an individual computer in a net-
work. Chad Perrin, Is the IP Address the New SSN?, TECHREPUBLIC (May 23, 2011, 12:00
PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/is-the-ip-address-the-new-ssn/5486.
7. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 1.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part Il.
10. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 1.
11. Embedded within the personal jurisdiction issue is the question of proper venue.
This Note discusses only personal jurisdiction. These lawsuits also raise a First Amendment
issue, although that issue is not discussed in this Note.
12. Compare Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1-171, 810 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C.
2011) (denying motion to quash subpoena and dismiss action), with Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does
1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011 WL 3652521 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (granting the motion
to quash and dismissing the case without prejudice).
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thus, the minimum procedural requirements proposed in Part II could help
protect defendants by reining in these mass lawsuits.
I. FROM NAPSTER TO BITTORRENT: THE EVOLUTION OF
ONLINE INFRINGEMENT
Copyright holders' war against peer-to-peer file sharing began with the
rise of computer programs like Napster, which allowed individuals to down-
load music online for free. Beginning in 2003, the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") launched a large-scale litigation cam-
paign against individuals who allegedly infringed music labels' copyrights
using peer-to-peer file-sharing programs from their personal computers. 3
The end of the RIAA campaign in 200814 brought about a relative lull in
lawsuits against online file sharers.'5 However, the void left by the RIAA
has recently been filled by an explosion of mass copyright infringement
lawsuits against BitTorrent file sharers. This Part gives a short history of the
RIAA campaign and discusses the new issues raised by the BitTorrent law-
suits. Section L.A discusses how several courts rebuffed the RIAA's attempts
to join many anonymous defendants in a single lawsuit. Section I.B explains
how the mechanics of the BitTorrent file-sharing protocol differentiate it
from other file-sharing services, and how this allows plaintiffs in BitTorrent
lawsuits to make joinder arguments that the RIAA could not.
A. Misjoinder and the RIAA Campaign Against File Sharing
After focusing its efforts on shutting down peer-to-peer file-sharing ser-
vices such as Napster and Kazaa, in 2003 the RIAA began to direct its legal
efforts toward prosecuting the individuals sharing the files. 6 These lawsuits
marked the first time "copyright laws [had] been used on a mass scale
against individual Internet users."' 7 First, the RIAA would obtain the IP ad-
dresses of alleged infringers by using the peer-to-peer program to search for
a particular copyrighted recording and then collect the IP addresses of any-
one uploading that recording.' 8 The RIAA turned to this tactic after the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals rebuffed its initial strategy of using the special
13. See Christopher M. Swartout, Comment, Toward a Regulatory Model of Internet
Intermediary Liability: File-Sharing and Copyright Enforcement, 31 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
499, 505 (2011).
14. Id.
15. David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign,
WIRED (May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), http://www.wired.comthreatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump/.
16. John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers, CNET NEWS (Sept. 8, 2003, 10:57
AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-3-5072564.html.
17. Id.
18. Lisa M. Bowman, Labels Aim Big Guns at Small File Swappers, CNET NEWS (June
25, 2003, 11:04 AM), http://news.cnet.comLabels-aim-big-guns-at-small-file-swappers/2100-
10273-1020876.html; RIAA v. People 5 Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 2 (Sept.
2008), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter RIAA v. People].
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subpoena provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") to
compel ISPs to disclose the names and contact information of the subscriber
connected with each IP address. 9
The RIAA began filing mass lawsuits that joined together many alleged
infringers, with each IP address representing a different putative defendant
identified as "John Doe."20 After filing the lawsuit, the RJAA would "ask the
court to authorize subpoenas against the ISPs. ''21 These lawsuits presaged
the current BitTorrent lawsuits, as the RIAA joined numerous John Does in
one action and filed the actions in forums unlikely to have personal jurisdic-
tion over many of the anonymous defendants.22 Moreover, it soon became
abundantly clear that the ultimate goal of these lawsuits was settlement: af-
ter obtaining the identities of the John Does, the record companies almost
always settled with the defendants.2 3
Many courts authorized these initial subpoenas as a matter of course.24
Yet, when these subpoenas were challenged on procedural grounds, courts
almost always sided with the defendants. 25 The courts spoke with particular
force on the joinder issue. Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, defendants may be joined together in one action under the following
conditions:
(A) Any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, oc-
currence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) Any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.
2 6
When confronted with file-sharing cases, a number of courts ruled that "de-
fendants' use of the same ISP and [peer-to-peer] networks to allegedly
commit copyright infringement is, without more, insufficient for permissive
19. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 E3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). The DMCA subpoena provisions would have compelled ISPs to disclose the names
of subscribers who the RIAA suspected of infringing without need for a court order. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(h) (2006).
20. John Schwartz, Recording Industry Is Accusing 532 People of Music Piracy, N.Y
IMES, Jan. 21, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com2004/01/2l/business/2 I WIRE-MUSIC.html.
21. RIAA v. People, supra note 18, at 4.
22. See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music
Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1049, 1053 (2008).
23. See id. at 1059-60.
24. Id. at 1059.
25. See, e.g., LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL
544992, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008); BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. Civ.A. 04-650, 2004
WL 953888, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2004); Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv-197-
Orl-22DAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *19-20 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004). But see, e.g.,
Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 E Supp. 2d 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2008); London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 180-81 (D. Mass. 2008).
26. FED. R. Ov. P. 20(a)(2).
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joinder under Rule 20."27 Other courts found that joinder was improper
because most of the complaints included "factually distinct actions" involv-
ing "different property, facts, and defenses" that were brought in one
lawsuit. 2
8
Having found misjoinder in those cases, the courts severed the John
Does pursuant to Rule 21, which states that "[m]isjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at
any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any
claim against a party."29 The courts, however, were less willing to confront
questions of personal jurisdiction so long as the defendants remained anon-
ymous, often ruling that such questions were premature.30 While the flow of
RIAA lawsuits abated before courts could definitively reject such lawsuits,
the new BitTorrent file-sharing cases have renewed the opportunity for a
forceful and clear rejection of these procedurally improper suits.
B. BitTorrent File Sharing
Even though the courts usually found misjoinder in the RIAA lawsuits,
plaintiffs in BitTorrent lawsuits often nevertheless seek to join many
defendants in single lawsuits. To understand why plaintiffs contend that
joinder of BitTorrent file sharers is appropriate, it is important to explain
what distinguishes BitTorrent file sharing from file sharing through other
peer-to-peer services. Previous incarnations of peer-to-peer file-sharing net-
works suffered a free-rider problem wherein a substantial majority of users
downloaded but never uploaded content.3 1 BitTorrent "solve[s] the problem
of [peer-to-peer] free riding quite elegantly-by making it architecturally
impossible for any peer on the network to take without giving."32 By mini-
mizing the inefficiencies caused by free riders, BitTorrent facilitates the
relatively quick transmission of large files, such as full-length movies.33
Consequently, it has exploded in popularity and currently has over 100 mil-
lion active monthly users.34
27. LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *3; see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Does 1-9, No.
07-1515, 2008 WL 919701, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2008) (holding that the plaintiff failed to
allege any facts sufficient to link all of the joined defendants).
28. BMG Music, 2004 WL 953888, at *1; see also Interscope Records, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27782, at *11.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
30. See Dickman, supra note 22, at 1095.
31. Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 695, 700 (2011).
32. Id.at700-01.
33. See Raymond Lei Xia & Jogesh K. Muppala, A Survey of BitTorrent Performance,
12 IEEE CoMms. SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 140, 140 (2010).
34. Austin Carr, BitTorrent Has More Users than Netflix and Hulu Combined--and
Doubled, FASTCOMPANY (Jan. 4, 2011, 9:19 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1714001/
bittorrent-swells-to- 100-million-users.
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Instead of a centralized server, the BitTorrent protocol works by facili-
tating the distribution of data between users, allowing them to exchange
pieces of a file with one another so that they can eventually assemble those
pieces into a complete copy of that file.3 5 The exchange occurs completely
between peers and is facilitated by "a tracker, which helps peers locate other
peers offering desired content."36 A "swarm" is a group of peers that are
joined together in the downloading and sharing of a particular individual
filey.3 The swarm is composed of two classes of peers: "leechers" and
"seeds. '31 "A leecher is a peer in the process of acquiring a file. A seed is a
peer that already has a complete copy of the file and that remains in the tor-
rent to serve the leechers. Every torrent requires at least one seed."39 In order
for a swarm to develop, one peer must act as the "initial seed" and make the
complete file available to interested peers.
40
A peer seeking to download a new file starts out as a leecher. To begin
the process, he must download a "torrent" file that will lead him to the rele-
vant tracker.41 The tracker then connects the leecher with the swarm
allowing him to "download[] fixed-size pieces of the requested file" from
peers within that swarm.42 As the leecher downloads pieces of the file, he
simultaneously shares those newly acquired pieces "with other leechers in
the [swarm]."'" Once a leecher has downloaded the entire file, he becomes a
new seed." Thus, the swarm ensures that all peers in the swarm are simulta-
neously downloading from and sharing with their neighbors pieces of the
particular file. More peers in a swarm make for faster downloads "because
there are more sources of each piece of the file. '4 5 In addition, the protocol
has an internal mechanism that makes sure that those peers who are "offer-
ing little or nothing to the torrent will get little or nothing from it."46 This
provides an incentive for a peer to remain in the swarm even after the down-
load is complete.47
35. Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 WL
3100404, at * I (N.D. Cal. May 31,2011).
36. Bridy, supra note 31, at 701.
37. Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *1.
38. Bridy, supra note 31, at 701 (footnotes omitted).
39. Id.
40. Michael Brown, White Paper: How BitTorrent Works, MAXIMUM PC (July 10, 2009,
8:00 AM), http://www.maximumpc.conarticle/features/white-paper.bittorrent.
41. Carmen Carmack, How BitTorrent Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/bittorrent2.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). Torrent files are easily availa-
ble on the internet. See id.
42. Bridy, supra note 31, at 701.
43. Id.
44. Xia & Muppala, supra note 33, at 142.
45. Carmack, supra note 41.
46. Bridy, supra note 31, at 702.
47. See Carmack, supra note 41 (noting that users who stay plugged into a swarm after
their download is complete, and who thus continue to be a source for the particular file, will
enjoy faster download rates in the future).
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The key difference between BitTorrent and other peer-to-peer file-
sharing systems is that BitTorrent makes file sharing a cooperative endeavor.
In other peer-to-peer systems, a peer searches for a single peer who possess-
es the desired file, and once located, the searching peer downloads directly
from the sharing peer. 8 So long as another user is offering content for
download, the downloading peer is under no obligation to share any content
himself. However, with BitTorrent, a peer who wishes to free ride on other
peers will find himself stymied since he cannot download unless he contrib-
utes to the swarm.
49
Moreover, BitTorrent operates in a largely decentralized fashion. Data is
not stored on a central server. Rather, a user downloads the file in discrete
segments from many different users who send data directly to one another.50
While trackers coordinate and assist peers in locating a swarm, the tracker
itself sends out very little data.51 This makes BitTorrent an extremely effi-
cient mechanism for transferring large files and at the same time, it insulates
the protocol itself from anti-piracy efforts "[b]ecause there are no central
servers to enjoin from unlawfully distributing copyrighted content."52 Thus,
when copyrighted data is transmitted via BitTorrent, the copyright holder is
largely limited to holding the individual file sharers liable for infringement.
Despite the legal precedents derived from the RIAA litigations, which
almost uniformly found those mass copyright infringement lawsuits to be-
procedurally invalid, BitTorrent copyright owners have adopted the mass
lawsuit as their primary vehicle for pursuing individual infringers. Copy-
right holders insist that BitTorrent is different from previous peer-to-peer
systems because BitTorrent file sharing "necessitates a concerted action by
many people in order to disseminate files. 53 Since obtaining a file requires
all members of a swarm to share bits of the file with other members of the
swarm, the copyright holders argue that all members of the swarm have
acted in concert to facilitate the infringement.5 4 Consequently, copyright
holders argue that joinder is proper because their actions against the joined
file sharers arise out of "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences. '55
48. Xia & Muppala, supra note 33, at 140.
49. Id.
50. See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 244-45 (N.D. I11.
2011).
51. Id. at 244.
52. Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 WL
3100404, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011).
53. Complaint at 5, Pac. Century Int'l, Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-1 1-02533 (DMR)
(N.D. Cal. July 8,2011), 2011 WL 2461149.
54. See id.
55. FED. R. Cv. P. 20(a)(2).
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II. REINING IN MASS LAWSUITS WITH MINIMUM
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
For the plaintiffs in mass lawsuits against BitTorrent file sharers, the
game is essentially won or lost at the expedited discovery stage. If the plain-
tiffs obtain expedited discovery, they are free to issue subpoenas requiring
ISPs to disclose the name and address of the account holder associated with
each IP address. Armed with that identifying information, the plaintiff is
free to demand that these putative defendants settle. This Part argues that
federal district courts must not grant expedited discovery when the mass
lawsuit is procedurally defective. It advocates imposing minimum require-
ments to ensure that John Doe defendants have been properly joined and
that they are not haled into a court that lacks jurisdiction over them. Section
II.A provides a short background on the expedited discovery process. Sec-
tion II.B argues that John Does should not be joined unless they participated
in a contemporaneous swarm. Section II.C argues that plaintiffs should
demonstrate a good-faith belief that the forum will have personal jurisdic-
tion over every joined defendant.
A. Moving for Expedited Discovery
Typically, discovery is forbidden before the parties have held a Rule
26(f) discovery conference.5 6 However, under certain circumstances, a party
may seek a court order allowing it to take limited, expedited discovery prior
to a discovery conference.s 7 Copyright holders argue that they need expedit-
ed discovery because they cannot identify the defendants beyond their IP
addresses without subpoenaing the ISPs for the identifying information at-
tached to each address.5 8
Most federal district courts confront the procedural validity of these
mass BitTorrent lawsuits either on a plaintiff's motion for expedited discov-
ery5 9 or, if expedited discovery has been granted, on a defendant's or ISP's
motion to quash a subpoena requesting the name associated with the IP
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1).
57. Id.; see also AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-97, No. C-11-03067-CW (DMR), 2011
WL 2912909, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2011). Rule 26 does not specify a standard that courts
should employ when assessing a motion for expedited discovery, and case law has revealed
two common standards employed by judges. Under the more stringent test, expedited discov-
ery is granted only upon a showing of some irreparable injury. However, under the more
liberal "reasonableness" test, the court decides whether to grant expedited discovery "based on
the 'reasonableness of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances.'" In re Fannie
Mae Derivative Litig., 227 F.R.D. 142, 142 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Entm't Tech. Corp. v. Walt
Disney Imagineering, No. 03-3546, 2003 WL 22519440, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2003)). How-
ever, in many courts, discovery as to facts that would establish jurisdiction is granted liberally.
See Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2011).
58. E.g., Pac. Century Int'l, Inc. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533 (DMR), 2011 WL
2690142, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011).
59. E.g., Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34; New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1-1474, No. C
11-2770 MEJ, 2011 WL 4407222 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011).
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address. 6' Across the country, and even within the same venue, district
courts are split on whether to grant expedited discovery on the basis of a
complaint identifying only anonymous John Doe defendants. Like the earli-
er RIAA lawsuits, the BitTorrent lawsuits raise the question of proper
joinder. Unlike with the RIAA lawsuits, however, several courts have actual-
ly given serious consideration to the personal jurisdiction issue.
A plaintiff's request for expedited discovery marks the appropriate time
for courts to address issues of joinder and jurisdiction. Because none of the
John Does can contest a motion for expedited discovery, such motions "only
provide one side of [the] story," and "courts must examine them with partic-
ular rigor."6' This is especially true given that the plaintiffs in these mass
lawsuits pursue a litigation strategy aimed at obtaining "pre-service discov-
ery and facilitat[ing] mass settlement" so that the case effectively ends once
they have been granted expedited discovery.62 These cases are neither de-
signed nor intended to ever go to trial. 63 By circumventing joinder and
personal jurisdiction rules, these plaintiffs use copyright laws to implement
a low-cost, high-volume litigation strategy that is tantamount to a "massive
collection scheme."' Thus, if courts do not address procedural deficiencies
at this point, it is very likely that such deficiencies will never be chal-
lenged.65
B. Proper Joinder: The Contemporaneous Swarm Requirement
When considering whether John Does have been properly joined, judges
should require plaintiffs to plead facts sufficient to show that the defendants
were not only part of the same swarm, but that they were part of the same
swarm at the same time as one another. If plaintiffs fail to satisfy this stand-
ard, expedited discovery should be denied and the improperly joined
defendants should be severed from the action.66 Generally, this means that a
plaintiff would be unable to join every member of a swarm that exists for a
protracted period of time.67 Rather, the plaintiff would have to show that all
60. E.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 E Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
The analysis of the procedural issues in these cases is the same whether considered at the
expedited discovery stage or on a motion to quash.
61. Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1-21, No. 11-2258 SC, 2011 WL 1812786, at *3
(N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011).
62. 10 Grp., Inc. v. Does 1-435, No. CIO-04382 SI, 2011 WL 445043, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 3,2011).
63. See Keegan Hamilton, Porn, Piracy, & BitTorrent, SEATTLE WKLY. (Aug. 10,
2011), http://www.seattleweekly.com2011-08-10/news/porn-piracy-bittorrent/.
64. See On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-501t, No. C1O-4472 BZ, 2011 WL 4018258, at
*5 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).
65. For more on the low-cost, high-volume litigation strategy, see infra Part II.
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
67. See Third Degree Films v. Does 1-3577, No. C 11-02768 LB, 2011 WL 5374569,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (finding that joinder was inappropriate because the 3,000 Doe-
defendant downloads occurred over a period of nearly seven months).
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the defendants downloaded the copyrighted work over a short enough period
of time to support a probable inference that all the defendants were present
in the swarm at the same time. 68 Such a time period would usually span
hours rather than days or months.69
The key feature distinguishing BitTorrent file sharing from the file-
sharing programs at issue in the RIAA cases is the cooperative activity that
takes place within the BitTorrent swarm. This cooperative activity allows the
plaintiffs to assert that BitTorrent users' downloads "stem from the same
transaction or occurrence" since the protocol "makes every downloader also
an uploader of the illegally transferred file[]."7 ° However, for this claim to
support joinder, the plaintiff must show that each joined defendant actually
assisted all the other joined defendants in obtaining the file.71 This is only
possible if all the joined John Does were members of the same contempora-
neous swarm.
A BitTorrent swarm develops around a particular seeded file, rather than
a particular copyrighted work.72 Thus, there can be (and usually are) several
different files of the same copyrighted work available for download, and
each file is associated with a separate and distinct swarm. 73 Thus, the issue is
not whether membership in a common swarm is necessary for joinder,74 but
68. Cf Berlin Media Art e.k. v. Does 1-44, No. 11-03770 (JSC), 2012 WL 215814, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (denying motion for expedited discovery based on the plaintiff's
failure to plead the date and time of infringement).
69. Although, if the plaintiff could show that all the Doe defendants remained a part of
the swarm for the entire period, then joinder might be appropriate. The key is that every indi-
vidual Doe's presence in the swarm must be coextensive with every other Doe that has been
joined.
70. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 E Supp. 2d 332, 343 (D.D.C.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cases discussing joinder generally focus on the
"same transaction or occurrence" prong of Rule 20. The second prong of the joinder test-
whether "any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action," FED.
R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B)-is discussed in some cases approving discovery, see, e.g., Call of the
Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 343-44, but it is just an ancillary issue that the court must address
since both prongs of the test must be satisfied for joinder to be appropriate. On the other hand,
courts denying expedited discovery do not need to address this second prong because failure
to meet the "same transaction or occurrence" prong is sufficient to render joinder improper.
See Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that Rule 20 imposes two
requirements and that both must be met for joinder to be sustained).
71. MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-149, No. C 11-02331 LB, 2011 WL 4352110, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (rejecting joinder of defendants because plaintiff "failed to show that any
of the 149 Doe defendants actually exchanged any piece of the seed file with one another").
72. Hard Drive Prods. v. Does 1-53, No. C- 11-2330 EDL, 2011 WL 2837399, at *1
(N.D. Cal. July 14, 2011); Pac. Century Int'l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-1 1-02533 (DMR),
2011 WL 2690142, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (noting that a swarm develops around a
specific file).
73. Pac. Century Int'l Ltd., 2011 WL 2690142, at *3.
74. See Raw Films, Inc. v. Does 1-32, No. 1:1 1-CV-2939-TWT, 2011 WL 6840590, at
*1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2011) (noting that plaintiff relied on a "swarm joinder" theory in argu-
ing that joinder is proper); Eriq Gardner, Massive 'Expendables' Piracy Lawsuit Dropped but
Will Be Refiled Soon, THE HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 26, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/massive-expendables-piracy-lawsuit-dropped-228300
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rather whether membership in a common swarm alone is sufficient to sup-
port joinder. As one judge explained, "[I]t is difficult to see how the sharing
and downloading ... as part of a chain or 'swarm' of connectivity designed
to illegally copy and share the exact same copyrighted file ... could not
constitute a 'series of transactions or occurrences' for purposes of Rule
20(a). '75 It is not. Just because defendants were part of the same swarm does
not mean that they were collaborating with all other members of the
swarm.7 6 Merely participating in a common swarm does not establish that
any one defendant provided bits of the infringed file to all other defendants
in that swarm. 77
The same swarm can continue in existence for extended periods of time,
sometimes months.78 When the activity of the defendants within the swarm
covers a broad time span, it is hard to believe that all the defendants were
engaged in the "same transaction or occurrence. '79 For instance, it is im-
probable that Doe 1, who was in a swarm in January, was still in that swarm
in June when Doe 100 entered.80 Indeed, it is exceedingly unlikely that "[in
this age of instant digital gratification ... an alleged infringer of [a] copy-
righted work would patiently wait [several] weeks to collect the bits of the
work necessary to watch the work as a whole."81 Copyright holders insist
that joinder is appropriate because "[e]ach putative defendant is a possible
source ... and may be responsible for distributing the [copyrighted materi-
al] to the other putative defendants. 82 However, if Doe 1 is not in the swarm
(noting that a studio whose lawsuit was dismissed for joining users from multiple swarms
planned to continue to pursue mass lawsuits in the future but only by joining defendants who
came from a single swarm).
75. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, No. 12-CV-00126 (AJN), 2012 WL 263491, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012).
76. Boy Racer v. Does 2-52, No. C 11-02834 LHK (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86746, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) ("[Tlhe nearly six-week span covering the activity
associated with each of the addresses calls into question whether there was ever common
activity linking the 51 addresses in this case.").
77. See Hard Drive Prods. v. Does 1-188, 809 E Supp. 2d 1150, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
("The bare fact that a Doe clicked on a command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does
not mean that they were part of the downloading by unknown hundreds or thousands of indi-
viduals across the country or across the world.").
78. See SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-3036, No. 11-4220 SC, 2011 WL 6002620, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) ("Here, the Doe Defendants' alleged participation in the same
swarm spanned approximately a four-month period from May 2011 through August 2011.").
79. Id.; see also Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1-131, No. 12-108-PHX-JAT, 2012
WL 692993, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 1, 2012) (finding that joinder is not appropriate for a swarm
that lasts many months because some participants may never overlap one another); Hard
Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 ("[T]he nearly six-week span covering the activity as-
sociated with each of the addresses calls into question whether there was ever a common
activity linking [them]... ").
80. Raw Films, Inc. v. Does 1-32, No. 1:11-CV-2939-TWT, 2011 WL 6840590, at *2
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2011).
81. Boy Racer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86746, at *9.
82. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 343 (D.D.C.
2011).
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at the same time as Doe 100, Doe 1 cannot be a source for Doe 100, and
thus the two Does should not be joined.83
By way of further example,' imagine a swarm developed around a file
seeded by A. On Day 1, B, C, and D enter that swarm with A and help each
other acquire the file by exchanging pieces of the file with one another.
Their exchange can fairly be called the same "series of transactions" for
purposes of Rule 20 .8 Now, after the exchange, assume all four stay
plugged into the swarm through Day 2, uploading pieces of the file to any
other users who enter into the swarm. On Day 3, B, C, and D disconnect.
The next day E, F, and G enter the swarm with A. Since the swarm develops
around the file, E, F, and G are part of the same swarm that A, B, and C
were in. However, now the file exchange is occurring between A, E, F, and
G. By contrast, B, C, and D have no involvement with the second exchange
because they left the swarm.86 Given that B, C, and D were not and could
not be sources for E, F, and G, the former group's acquisition of the file was
a wholly separate series of transactions from the latter's. Instead, the only
link between the parties is that they "used the same peer-to-peer network to
copy and reproduce [a plaintiff's] video[]," which has time and again been
ruled insufficient to meet the requirements for joinder.87 So long as the
plaintiffs cannot allege more, they fail to prove that the defendants engaged
in closely related transactions.88
No matter how permissive Rule 20 joinder may be,89 there still must be a
relationship connecting the parties for their discrete infringements to
83. See Berlin Media Art e.k. v. Does 1-44, No. 11-03770, 2012 WL 215814, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) ("[T]he Court cannot see how joinder is proper where, as here,
'Plaintiff [did] not plead facts showing that any particular defendant illegally shared plaintiff's
work with any other particular defendant.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting Boy Racer,
Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. 11-01738,2011 WL 3652521, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011))).
84. It is worth noting that this is a greatly simplified example. In reality, swarms will
include hundreds or even thousands of users and may continue for months.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
86. See Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 WL
3100404, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (observing that a BitTorrent downloader "continues
distributing data to the peers in the swarm until the user manually disconnects form [sic] the
swarm"); Hamilton, supra note 63 ("People come and go from the swarm .... They pop in
and share for a while, then they're done sharing and they leave.").
87. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 WL 4915551, at *4
(E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011).
88. Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *3.
89. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("Under the
Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with
fairness to the parties; joinder ... is strongly encouraged"). Note that joinder must be "con-
sistent with fairness to the parties," and see infra Part III for why joinder is unfair to the John
Does. Furthermore, "permitting joinder in [these] case[s] would undermine Rule 20(a)'s pur-
pose of promoting judicial economy and trial convenience because it would result in a
logistically unmanageable case." Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150,
1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also infra Part III (explaining the case manageability issues pre-
sented by joinder).
November 20121
Michigan Law Review
constitute a series of transactions or occurrences. 90 Plaintiffs argue that even
if the defendants were not in the swarm at the same time, they still acted in
concert because their participation in that swarm "contributed to the chain of
data distribution." 91 However, as the example above demonstrates, this is not
necessarily true. Had B, C, and D never participated in the swarm, E, F, and
G would still have been able to obtain the file. Thus, it is not always the case
that the earlier activity of participants in a BitTorrent swarm paved the way
for later participants to obtain the file. 92
Even outside of the file-sharing context, courts have ruled that joinder is
improper "in the absence of a transactional link."93 In a series of lawsuits
against defendants accused of possessing devices used to illegally intercept
a satellite provider's encrypted communications, several courts ruled that the
defendants were improperly joined. 94 While the defendants may have
harmed the satellite provider in the same way, each defendant's use of the
device was "a separate and independent act."95 Absent any concerted activity
linking the defendants, joinder was improper.96 Similarly, when a BitTorrent
user leaves the swarm, any subsequent downloads are independent from that
user's activity prior to his departure. Departed users had no role in subse-
quent downloads nor did they "kn[o]w of the others' transactions. '97 In the
example above, the fact that A was present during the B-C-D and E-F-G
transactions is not dispositive. That a common party might have facilitated
90. See SB Designs, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 305 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (finding that absence of a relationship between four companies accused of trademark
infringement made joinder impermissible because none of the parties "made possible," in-
duced, or contributed to any other defendant's infringement); Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1370-71 (D.
Del. 1983) (finding misjoinder in an action for patent infringement because "[a]llegations of
infringement against two unrelated parties based on different acts do not arise from the same
transaction").
91. MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-149, No. C 11-02331 LB, 2011 WL 4352110, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 16, 2011).
92. In the hypothetical example, had B stayed in the swarm as the seeder and A with-
drawn with C and D, that would be a case in which the earlier activity of the swarm helped
later participants obtain the file. These hypotheticals are just possible permutations of activity
going on in a single swarm. Still, just because it is possible to come up with an example that
connects swarm participants from two different times does not imply that a connection can be
forged between participants at all times. Without evidence showing that all of "the Doe de-
fendants actually acted in concert to illegally download" the copyrighted work, joinder is
inappropriate, particularly when the swarm spans an extended period of time. Id.
93. DIRECTV v. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D. 639,642 (S.D. Iowa 2003).
94. E.g., In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24263 (N.D.
Cal. July 26, 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Beecher, 296 F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Ind. 2003); Lous-
saert, 218 F.R.D. at 639.
95. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D. at 639.
96. See In re DIRECTV, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24263, at *9; Tele-Media Co. of W.
Conn. v. Antidormi, 179 F.R.D. 75, 76 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding that joint action was required
for joinder of defendants to be proper).
97. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D. at 643.
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two separate transactions is not enough to connect the parties to those trans-
actions for purposes of Rule 20.98
Those courts that grant motions for expedited discovery generally do so
because they are convinced by the plaintiff's assertion that each John Doe
defendant may have had a role in the distribution of the copyrighted work at
issue to any of the other joined defendants.99 Thus, the plaintiff has "suffi-
ciently alleged that [its] claims against the defendants potentially stem from
the same transaction or occurrence."' lo Still, these courts acknowledge that
"defendants may be able to rebut these allegations later" once they are offi-
cially named and added to the suit.' Of course this will be of little comfort
to the John Does since they will be forced to settle before they can rebut
those allegations. 10 2 Moreover, as explained above, participating in the same
swarm by itself does not necessarily prove that there is a sufficient transac-
tional connection to justify joining the participants. 0 3 It is thus fair to
require the plaintiff to bear the burden of demonstrating not just a possibility
but a high probability that the defendants were engaged in the same transac-
tion or occurrence.
This requirement is not manifestly unreasonable and some complaints
already allege such detailed facts. For example, the complaint in Liberty
Media Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-62 listed, for each of the sixty-two defend-
ants, the time and date that the alleged infringing activity occurred.? 4
According to that complaint, all of the alleged infringing activity occurred
over a period of seven hours. 05 Since members of a BitTorrent swarm will
usually remain in a swarm for some time after they have completely
98. Cf DIRECTV, Inc. v. Boggess, 300 F Supp. 2d 444, 449 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) ("The
only connection between the defendants is that all of the pirate access devices were allegedly
purchased from the same Internet retailer and were allegedly used to intercept the same satel-
lite signal.... [These] minimal allegations are too remote to meet the 'reasonably related'
test.").
99. New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1-1474, No. C 11-2770 MEJ, 2011 WL 4407222, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d
332, 343 (D.D.C. 2011); W. Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-5829, 275 F.R.D. 9, 15-16 (D.D.C.
2011).
100. Call of the Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (emphases added).
101. Id.; see also Raw Films, Ltd. v. John Does 1-11, No. 12cv368-WQH (NLS), 2012
WL 684763, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) ("The Court notes ... that there is a question as to
whether.., joinder will be proven appropriate once the necessary facts are established.").
102. See infra Part III; see also MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-149, No. C 11-02331 LB, 2011
WL 4352110, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) ("MCGIP's litigation strategy also effectively
precludes consideration of joinder issues at a later point in the proceedings .... Deferring a
ruling on joinder, then, would 'encourage[ ][p]laintiffs to join (or misjoin) as many doe de-
fendants as possible.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-11,
No. 1:07-CV-2828, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90183, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008))).
103. See MCGIP, 2011 WL 4352110, at *3 ("Absent evidence that the Doe defendants
actually acted in concert to illegally download [the film] on those 36 separate days ... joinder
is inappropriate.").
104. Complaint, Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-62, No. I -CV-575-MMA-
NLS, 2011 WL 6934460 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2011).
105. Id.
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downloaded the file, 10 6 this persuasively demonstrates that all sixty-two John
Does were physically present in that swarm at the same time, and thus that
Doe 1 was a potential source for Does 2 through 62. Thus, the plaintiff in
Liberty Media adequately demonstrated that all the Does were indeed en-
gaged in the "same transaction or occurrence" and thus were properly joined
under Rule 20(a).
C. Personal Jurisdiction: Resident-of-the-Forum-State Requirement
People all over the United States use BitTorrent to share and acquire
files. 107 Thus, when a plaintiff joins numerous John Does in a single lawsuit
without making any effort to determine where the Does are located, it is
almost certain that many, and likely most, of the defendants live outside of
the forum where that lawsuit was filed. 108 This raises the question of wheth-
er that forum will have jurisdiction over the nonresident Does. The answer is
clearly "no." Therefore, a plaintiff should not be granted expedited discov-
ery when it "offers only speculation or conclusory assertions about
[defendants'] contacts with a forum state."1°9 Rather, a plaintiff should be
required to establish a good-faith belief that the forum court will have per-
sonal jurisdiction over all of the joined John Does. A good-faith belief could
be shown by using inexpensive and readily available geolocation technology
to approximate the location of each John Doe."0
A state's power to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant is limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
106. The BitTorrent protocol will punish users who only download without also upload-
ing, see Xia & Muppala, supra note 33, at 140, so that once a user has completed downloading
a file, he will tend to remain in the swarm for some time as a pure uploader, see Hard Drive
Prods. v. Does 1-188, 809 E Supp. 2d 1150, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Still, the user is not re-
quired to remain as an uploader and there is no guarantee that any particular user will do so
after any particular download, making it hard to estimate if or how long a user will remain in
the swarm after acquiring the file.
107. See Leslie Horn, Report: NefLix Is Largest Source of Internet Traffic in North
America, PCMAG.COM (May 17, 2011, 3:14 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2385512,00.asp (discussing a study that revealed BitTorrent use accounts for 17.23
percent of Internet traffic in North America, second only to Nefflix).
108. See Berlin Media Art e.k. v. Does 1-654, No. 11-03770 (JSC), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120257, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (taking a random sample of the John Does'
IP addresses and finding only one of the thirteen addresses could be traced to the forum state);
Digiprotect USA Corp. v. Does 1-266, No. 10 Civ. 8759 (TPG), 2011 WL 1466073, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011) (finding that out of the 166 Doe defendants that the defendant was
seeking to identify, only ten had internet accounts in the forum state).
109. Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir.
2003).
110. See DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does 1-240, No. 10 Civ. 8760(PAC), 2011 WL
4444666, at *4 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 26, 2011) (finding that the plaintiff should not be excused from
showing that the defendants were connected to the forum state because of the easy availability
of locating information); Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 E Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C.
2011) ("Plaintiff can establish ... a good faith basis for ... personal jurisdiction by utilizing
geolocation services that are generally available to the public to derive the approximate loca-
tion of the IP addresses identified for each putative defendant.").
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Amendment.' For a nonresident defendant to be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the forum state, "he [must] have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.' ,,112 The nonresident defendant
must have sufficient contacts with the state "such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."'" 3 A defendant can "reasonably an-
ticipate" being subject to another state's jurisdiction if he "purposefully
avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 4 However, the
defendant cannot be "haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,'
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts."" 5 A federal district court's ability to
assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant is governed by the long-ann
statute of the state in which that court sits." 6 A state's long-arm statute al-
lows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent
allowed by the Due Process Clause." 7
The type of personal jurisdiction at issue in the BitTorrent mass lawsuits
is specific jurisdiction, in which the lawsuit "aris[es] out of' or relate[s] to
the defendant's contacts with the forum.""I8 While personal jurisdiction does
not depend on a John Doe's physical presence in the forum state, he still
must "purposefully direct" his infringing activities toward the forum state." 9
Although internet cases pose a particular challenge to the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction, it is hard see how any theory of personal jurisdiction
111. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,413-14 (1984).
112. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
113. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
114. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted); On the Cheap, LLC v.
Does 1-5011, No. C1O-4472 BZ, 2011 WL 4018258, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).
115. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 774 (1984), and World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299).
116. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 E3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 800-01. Some states' long-arm statutes are more restrictive in their limits on
personal jurisdiction than is the Due Process Clause. Many BitTorrent cases addressing per-
sonal jurisdiction have been decided in such states. See, e.g., DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does
1-240, No. 10 Civ. 8760 (PAC), 2011 WL 4444666 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011); Nu Image, Inc.
v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2011); Digiprotect USA Corp. v. Does 1-
266, No. 10 Civ. 8759 (TPG), 2011 WL 1466073, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011). Since this
Section argues that personal jurisdiction over out-of-state John Does could never be consistent
with the Due Process Clause, this necessarily means that it would also be inconsistent under
more restrictive long-arm statutes.
118. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984);
see also Liberty Media Holding, LLC v. Tabora, No. 1 1-cv-651-IEG (JMA), 2012 WL 28788,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (finding that in this BitTorrent file-sharing case, "the only issue
is whether the Court has specific jurisdiction over [the] Defendant"). The other type of per-
sonal jurisdiction is "general jurisdiction," in which a defendant has "sufficient contacts" with
the forum state such that personal jurisdiction is appropriate even though the claim did not
arise out of those contacts. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15.
119. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
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based on internet activity could subject a BitTorrent file sharer to another
state's personal jurisdiction based on an exchange of a small piece of a cop-
yrighted file with a user from the state asserting jurisdiction. 2 '
Given that BitTorrent file sharers are largely private individuals down-
loading files for private consumption,'2 ' the defendants' internet activity
hardly reaches the level of commerciality that would make personal jurisdic-
tion appropriate. 22 Moreover, the mere fact that a defendant's involvement
in a swarm results in contact with a foreign jurisdiction does not mean that
the defendant "purposefully directed" his activity toward that jurisdiction.2 3
Indeed, "a participant in a swarm has no control over where he distributes
the information .... Where the files get distributed to is controlled by the
location of other participants in the swarm .... ,124 Thus, a BitTorrent user's
contact with a foreign jurisdiction is random and unintentional.125 Since
John Does do not "expressly aim" their wrongful conduct at a foreign juris-
diction, it would be substantially unfair to the defendants to subject them to
suit in any foreign jurisdiction that they came into contact with through their
participation in a BitTorrent swarm. 126
These facts make it clear that out-of-state John Does cannot be haled in-
to a foreign jurisdiction. A judge should not grant a plaintiff's expedited
discovery request as to defendants who would later be dismissed, were the
120. See Berlin Media Art e.k. v. Does 1-654, No. 11-03770 (JSC), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120257, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011).
121. See Solutions Research Grp., Movie File-Sharing Booming: Study, SOLUTIONS RES.
GROUP (Jan. 24, 2006), http://www.srgnet.com/pdf/Movie%20File-Sharing%20Booming%
20Release%2OJan%2024%2007%20Final.pdf.
122. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (articulating a test for personal jurisdiction based on internet contacts that evaluated the
appropriateness of personal jurisdiction on the "nature and quality of commercial activity that
an entity conducts over the Internet"); see also BE2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 E3d 555, 558 (7th
Cir. 2011) ("Our inquiry boils down to this: has [defendant] purposely exploited the [forum
state's] market?").
123. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); see also Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (holding that personal jurisdiction was appropriate when
defendant "expressly aimed" their tortious activity toward the forum state and the brunt of the
harm was felt therein); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087
(9th Cir. 2000) (stating that out-of-state activity with a foreseeable effect in the forum state
does not give rise to personal jurisdiction without "something more," interpreting "something
more" as an express aiming of the act at the foreign jurisdiction).
124. Liberty Media Holding, LLC v. Tabora, No. I l-cv-65 1-IEG (JMA), 2012 WL
28788, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012).
125. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir.
2002) (articulating a test for personal internet jurisdiction requiring, among other things, that
the defendant "manifest[] [an] intent of engaging in business or other interactions within [a]
State"); cf Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774, 781 (finding that a publisher whose magazine had regular
monthly sales in the forum jurisdiction had "continuously and deliberately exploited" the
forum's market such that it was reasonable for it to be sued there).
126. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789; ALS Scan, 293 E3d at 714 ("[A] person who simply
places information on the Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into
which the electronic signal is transmitted and received."); see also Bancroft, 223 E3d at 1088.
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suit to move forward. 12 7 The minimum personal jurisdiction requirement
would mandate that a plaintiff show it has a good-faith belief that all named
John Does reside (or engaged in the infringing activity) within the forum's
territory. To show a good-faith belief in personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
could use geolocation technology or some other effective means. Good-faith
belief can be established by showing that the IP address comes from or is
reasonably proximate to the forum's territory.'28 Such a requirement entails
minimal cost to the plaintiff as this technology is cheap and readily availa-
ble. 129
The existence of such technology undermines the rationale of those
courts that believe that without jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs cannot
make their case for personal jurisdiction based on the limited information
they have on the John Does. 31 While the geolocation technology might not
be 100 percent accurate, it is still sufficiently accurate to place a John Doe
very near the jurisdiction, if not within it.' 3' At the very least, geolocation
technology is accurate enough to support a good-faith belief that the IP ad-
dress originates from or near the jurisdiction. 132
However, many copyright holders do not use this technology and instead
allege that merely by engaging in a swarm with any one defendant who is
found in the forum state, all defendants have engaged in concerted activity
within that jurisdiction sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.'33 Accept-
ing this theory would mean that any user of BitTorrent is subject to
jurisdiction in any state where another member of the swarm may be
found. 134 This result is unfair and falls far short of the purposeful availment
standard.135 One judge was untroubled by such a result because BitTorrent
file sharing does not involve "general Internet access, but specific use of a
file-sharing protocol that may touch multiple jurisdictions to effectuate a
download of a single copyrighted work."' 136 However, that argument fails to
explain why this difference means that the assertion of personal jurisdiction
127. See Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34,41 (D.D.C. 2011).
128. See id. (suggesting that good-faith basis for jurisdiction is made if the geolocation
search locates the IP address within the forum or within a city located within thirty miles of
the forum).
129. DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does 1-240, No. 10 Civ. 8760 (PAC), 2011 WL
4444666, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011).
130. See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 347-48
(D.D.C. 2011).
131. Nulmage,799ESupp.2dat41.
132. See, e.g., id.; DigiProtect, 2011 WL4444666, at *4.
133. See On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. C10-4472 BZ, 2011 WL 4018258, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).
134. See id.
135. Id.; see also Millenium TGA v. Doe, No. 10 C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110135, at *7 (N.D. Il. Sept. 26, 2011) (agreeing that participation in a swarm is not enough
to confer personal jurisdiction).
136. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 E Supp. 2d 332, 347 (D.D.C.
2011).
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over the John Does would not "offend the fundamental fairness which is the
touchstone of due process." '137 Especially given that BitTorrent file sharing
generally involves individuals downloading files from their homes for pri-
vate consumption, it is a stretch to assert that the nonresident defendants had
adequate "minimum contacts" with a foreign forum jurisdiction.
Some courts refuse to address the personal jurisdiction issue because
they believe that doing so would be premature. 138 They reason that Rule
12(b)(2) only allows defendants to raise this issue.' Since John Does do
not officially become defendants until they are named in the suit and non-
parties cannot raise the issue of personal jurisdiction, these courts have held
that defendants cannot seek dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction
before they have been officially named in the suit.140
However, courts can still exercise their broad discretion to deny discov-
ery to plaintiffs who cannot show a good-faith belief that the forum court
has personal jurisdiction over all defendants, even if such defendants cannot
seek dismissal from the suit on that basis.' 4 ' Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), federal
courts must limit otherwise permissible discovery when "the burden or ex-
pense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit."'' 42 Employing
that discretion to limit discovery is particularly important because "the
Court has a duty to prevent undue burden, harassment, and expense of third
parties.' 14 3 A nonparty's inability to move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) is
irrelevant to a judge's discretion to manage discovery under Rule 26. Thus, a
judge can exercise this managerial discretion to deny discovery when the
plaintiff cannot show a good-faith belief that the court has jurisdiction over
all the John Does. 144
III. WHY THE JOHN DOES NEED PROTECTION
When a court is confronted with a procedurally defective mass copyright
infringement suit, it should never ignore those procedural defects and grant
expedited discovery. If those procedural issues are not addressed early, they
will never be addressed at all because the plaintiff-copyright holders' low-
cost, high-volume mass litigation strategy effectively precludes the John
Does from defending themselves once their identities have been discovered.
Given this, enforcing minimum joinder and personal jurisdiction require-
ments before granting expedited discovery will provide substantial
137. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,470 (1985).
138. See, e.g., W. Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-5829, 275 F.R.D. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C.
2011).
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) ("[A] party may assert the following defenses by mo-
tion ... lack of personal jurisdiction .... (emphasis added)).
140. See, e.g., First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 250-51 (N.D. Ill.
2011).
141. Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36 (D.D.C. 201 l).
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
143. See Nu Image, 799 F Supp. 2d at 36-37.
144. Id. at 37.
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protection to the John Does. Moreover, these minimum requirements would
not be unfair to the plaintiffs because they would only ask the plaintiffs to
prove what they would have to prove if their cases were to go to trial.
The common refrain echoed by courts declining to conduct a searching
examination of joinder and personal jurisdiction issues at the expedited dis-
covery stage is that doing so would be premature. 45 They insist that the
defendants should raise such defenses once they are identified and named to
the lawsuit.14 6 However, this position ignores the reality behind these mass
lawsuits: the plaintiff has pursued a litigation strategy that effectively pre-
cludes later consideration of these issues.1 47 When confronted with such a
discovery request, "a court is not required to blind itself to the purpose for
which a party seeks information. 148
It is true the plaintiffs in these cases generally have legitimate substan-
tive grounds for their allegations of copyright infringement, and certainly
the majority of plaintiffs are motivated at least in part by sincere copyright
enforcement interests. 149 However, the plaintiffs also recognize that by tak-
ing certain procedural shortcuts, they can turn enforcement into a lucrative
business model. 15° The low-cost, high-volume mass lawsuit joins all alleged
infringers in one action and disregards personal jurisdiction requirements,
allowing plaintiffs to file a single claim in a single venue and thereby mini-
mize litigation CoStS. 151 A single action has the potential to reap the plaintiff
monetary gains in the six- and even seven-figure range, whereas adhering to
plausible theories of joinder and jurisdiction (which would likely require
splitting the action into several different actions) would be substantially less
profitable.15 2
In addition to the mass form of the lawsuit, the profitability of the low-
cost, high-volume model depends on the lawsuit never going to a jury.'53
145. See, e.g., Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 341,
345 (D.D.C. 2011).
146. Id.
147. See MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-149, No. C 11-02331 LB, 2011 WL 4352110, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011).
148. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 n.17 (1978).
149. See M. Alex Johnson, Porn Piracy Wars Get Personal, MSNBC.COM (July 20, 2011,
8:06 AM), http://www.technolog.msnbc.msn.com/technology/technologlpom-piracy-wars-get-
personal- 121928.
150. See Art Neill, Does a New Wave of Filesharing Lawsuits Represent a New Business
Model for Copyright Owners?, J. INTERNET L., June 2011, at 1, 8-9. For example, a single
action allows the plaintiff to avoid paying multiple filing fees. Allan Gregory, The Economics
of (Killing) Mass-BitTorrent Lawsuits, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 18, 2011),
http://torrentfreak.comlthe-economics-of-killing-mass-bittorrent-awsuits-1 10918/.
151. See David Kravets, How Mass BitTorrent Lawsuits Turn Low-Budget Movies Into
Big Bucks, WIRED (March 31, 2011, 2:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevelU
2011/03/bittorrentL.
152. Id.
153. See Hamilton, supra note 63.
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Indeed, the plaintiffs do not expect, nor do they want, to go to trial. 54 Ra-
ther, their litigation strategy hinges on the defendants' acceptance of their
settlement offer. When the plaintiff obtains the identity and contact infor-
mation of the individual John Does, each one is contacted and threatened
with a lawsuit unless he agrees to settle.'55 The settlement offer is generally
in the range of $2,000-$5,000, a number calculated to be less than the cost
of hiring a defense attorney.156 Moreover, the settlement offer alerts the
defendant that losing in court could result in liability of up to $150,000 in
statutory damages.'57 Consequently, "the pressure to settle rather than raise
legitimate defenses is high."'' 15 In essence, mass lawsuits are "a strong tool
for leveraging settlements-a tool whose efficiency is largely derived from
the plaintiffs' success in avoiding the filing fees for multiple suits and gain-
ing early access en masse to the identities of the alleged infringers."'59
Given the need to keep administrative costs low, plaintiffs are not "so
meticulous in their search for targets."'6 "[S]ince an innocent John Doe is
just as likely to pay up as a guilty one," the lawyers do not need to take
much care in ensuring that the John Doe actually was engaged in infringing
activity. 6' The strategy has been described as "shoot first, and identify ...
targets later."'' 62 Some plaintiffs anticipate cases of mistaken identity by as-
serting in their settlement letters that the defendant is "liable for copyright
infringement by merely having an unsecured wireless network/router even
though [he] did not download the work."' '63 Yet, such an assertion is unsup-
ported by any theory of contributory infringement or vicarious liability.' 64
Apparently, the only purpose of making such a blatantly false statement is to
scare the wrongfully accused into believing he is guilty so that he will settle.
Obviously, a plaintiff who makes such a statement cares more about whether
the defendant can pay the settlement than whether the defendant actually
committed the alleged infringement.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Cohn, supra note 2.
157. E.g., Steele Letter, supra note 2.
158. Cohn, supra note 2.
159. MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-149, No. C 11-02331 LB, 2011 WL 4352110, at *4 n.5
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011).
160. Hamilton, supra note 63.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. William Dotinga, Is Pornography Copyrightable?, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE
(Feb. 3, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/02/03/43613.htm; see also
Steele Letter, supra note 2 (identifying potential defendant solely by IP address, implicitly
suggesting that anyone with access to the network or router could have downloaded the work
in question).
164. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)
("One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement,
and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a
right to stop or limit it." (citations omitted)).
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Lying about potential liability is but one example of the bad behavior
that these mass lawsuits breed. In some cases, the conduct of the plaintiffs,
or their attorneys, in prosecuting these mass lawsuits has been deemed so
unethical that it has been sanctioned or threatened with sanctions. 165 In one
particularly egregious instance, an attorney for an adult video producer filed
a motion for expedited discovery that the court did not immediately grant. 166
In response to the delay, the attorney voluntarily dismissed the case and in-
stead served unauthorized subpoenas upon the ISPs. Upon receiving the
identities of the John Does, the attorney began contacting them and demand-
ing settlements. 67 The judge presiding over the dismissed action ordered
sanctions and chastised the attorney for his "staggering chutzpah," observ-
ing that "[t]he Court rarely has encountered a more textbook example of
conduct deserving of sanctions."'168
Cost concerns and bad-faith plaintiffs are not the only obstacles a John
Doe faces in defending himself. An additional factor works strongly in favor
of settlement: the nature of the copyrighted material. Often, the work at is-
sue is a pornographic film. 69 While the defendant might be confident in his
defense, pressing forward with the case would result in him being outed to
his family, friends, and community as a viewer of pornography' 7 That risk
alone is enough to make a potential defendant "inclined to agree to pay a
few thousand dollars to make the whole embarrassing, inconvenient mess go
away."'
17 1
Yet, a defendant who nevertheless decides to forge ahead in court will
encounter additional hurdles, namely the "significant case manageability"
and logistical issues that mass joinder creates. 72 Consider the following
example:
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see, e.g., Mick Haig Prods., e.K. v. Does 1-670, No. 3:10-CV-
1900-N, 2011 WL 5104095, at *1, *5 n.9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011) (sanctioning plaintiff's
attorney for serving unauthorized subpoenas on ISPs under Rules 26 and 45, but finding that
Rule 11 factors "also militate[d] in favor of the sanctions"); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-85, No.
3:11cv469-JAG (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011), available at https://www.eff.org/files/K-Beech.pdf
(plaintiff ordered to show cause for why its conduct did not violate Rule 11).
166. Mick Haig, 2011 WL 5104095, at *1.
167. Id. at*2, *5.
168. Id. at *5.
169. While many of the copyrighted works at the center of these lawsuits are generally
either pornography or low-budget, little-seen B-movies, there are some notable exceptions.
For example, the Academy Award-winning film (although not a box office blockbuster) The
Hurt Locker was at the center of the case Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, 818 F. Supp.
2d 28 (D.D.C. 2011), and the Sylvester Stallone action hit The Expendables was at issue in Nu
Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2011).
170. Mick Haig, 2011 WL 5104095, at *1 n.7.
171. Alison Frankel, How Porno Piracy Cases Are Breaking Copyright Ground,
THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/09/09/how-
porno-piracy-cases-are-breaking-copyright-ground/.
172. On The Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. C10-4472 BZ, 2011 WL 4018258, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164
(N.D. Cal. 201 1) (noting the administrative difficulties caused by mass joinder, where each
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John Doe 1 could be an innocent parent whose internet access was abused
by her minor child, while John Doe 2 might share a computer with a
roommate who infringed Plaintiffs' works. John Does 3 through 203 could
be thieves, just as Plaintiffs believe, inexcusably pilfering Plaintiffs' prop-
erty and depriving them, and their artists, of the royalties they are rightly
owed.173
Given the diverse pool of defendants, it is likely that many would raise dif-
ferent legal defenses based on their unique factual circumstances.
Consequently, joinder would create chaos and result in "scores of mini-trials
involving different evidence and testimony" being conducted within the
same action. 174 The costs and administrative difficulties of dealing with such
a complex and protracted case would be exacerbated for the defendant who
must defend himself in a faraway jurisdiction with which he has no connec-
tion whatsoever.'
Some courts that have granted expedited discovery in such cases have
made the dubious assertion that joinder will actually benefit the putative
defendants. For this conclusion, they rely on a RIAA case, London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, in which the court held that given the "similar, even
virtually identical, issues of law and fact," the defendants benefitted from
the ability "to see the defenses, if any, that other John Does have raised.' 7 6
Yet London-Sire involved mainly college students whose IP addresses came
from within the court's jurisdiction.'7 7 Thus, because the defendants were
similarly situated actors, the likelihood that they would have similar defens-
es was greater. The universe of defendants in the BitTorrent lawsuits is not
so limited, and "many of the Doe defendants will likely raise different
factual and legal defenses."17s In a single case, one Doe might be a
seventy-year-old grandmother who "doesn't know what a BitTorrent is,' ' 79
and another might be a legally blind person who is unable to even view
movies. 80 Given this sampling of the disparate substantive defenses that
defendants could raise, along with the procedural claims, it seems clear that
joinder is detrimental to the defendant.
defendant might file different motions, and any defendant could be "present and address the
court" at any proceeding or other event involving any other defendant, creating "a thoroughly
unmanageable situation").
173. Boy Racer v. Does 1-52, No. C 11-02834 LHK (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86746, at *9- 10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (quoting BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. 04-650,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8457, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2004)).
174. Hard Drive, 809 F Supp. 2d at 1164; On the Cheap, 2011 WL 4018258, at *2
(quoting Hard Drive, 809 E Supp. 2d at 1164).
175. On the Cheap, 2011 WL4018258, at *3.
176. 542 E Supp. 2d 153, 161 (D. Mass. 2008).
177. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 157-58; Complaint for Copyright Infringement,
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1. 542 F Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 04cv12434-
NG).
178. On the Cheap, 2011 WL 4018258, at *2.
179. Temple, supra note 1.
180. See Hamilton, supra note 63.
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The minimum requirements that this Note proposes accord due respect
to the validity of the plaintiffs' underlying substantive claims while at the
same time protecting defendants with strong procedural defenses from being
cornered into settlement. Moreover, by decreasing the recovery potential of
the mass lawsuit, the minimum requirements should weed out predatory
plaintiffs from the process. Importantly, the minimum requirements would
place no undue burden on plaintiffs: they only mandate that their lawsuits be
procedurally sound. This requires no more of the plaintiffs than they would
be required to show if these mass lawsuits went to trial.
Nor would the minimum requirements render lawsuits against Bit-
Torrent file sharers ineffective as a copyright enforcement mechanism."'
Indeed, some copyright holders have voluntarily opted to abide by similar
requirements and still find the lawsuits to be an effective tool for copyright
enforcement. 182 While the lawsuits might be rendered less lucrative as a re-
sult of the minimum requirements, they still could be valuable as a deterrent
to infringement.1 13 Certainly they would still achieve a professed aim of the
copyright holder: "'scar[ing] people' ... to stop them from 'stealing our
clients' content.' ,184
As for the John Does, the protection the minimum requirements would
afford is substantial. Since the requirements would filter out those defend-
ants with strong procedural defenses, any defendants whose identities are
discovered should be those defendants who realistically would stand a
chance of suffering an adverse ruling at trial. The minimum requirements
should also filter out a substantial number of the wrongfully accused. At
least for those wrongfully accused defendants who do wish to defend them-
selves, the personal jurisdiction requirement assures that they will not suffer
the prejudice of having to do so in a faraway forum.
Furthermore, the assertion that joinder could benefit the defendants 85
actually begins to ring true. First, because the minimum requirements will
likely keep the number of joined defendants low, they should help solve the
case manageability issues presented by mass joinder. 86 More importantly,
because the minimum requirements filter out defendants who will raise
181. See id. (citing one attorney for copyright holders who asserts that when mass law-
suits are "done right" they can be effective in combating piracy).
182. See id. (noting that a number of copyright attorneys representing adult studios vol-
untarily opt to sue only individuals or small groups in the jurisdiction where they reside).
183. See David McGuire, Report: Kids Pirate Music Freely, WASH. POST, May 18, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37231-2004May18.html (noting that the
number of people downloading music dropped significantly after the RIAA first started warn-
ing people that they could be sued for illegally sharing music).
184. Johnson, supra note 149.
185. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 161 (D. Mass. 2008)
(noting that joinder benefits defendants because it allows them to see the defenses raised by
the other defendants in the lawsuit).
186. See, e.g., On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. CIO-4472 BZ, 2011 WL
4018258, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (citing the "logistical" nightmare that would be cre-
ated by hundreds of defendants filing many different motions).
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procedural defenses, there is a far greater likelihood that the remaining cases
will involve "similar, even virtually identical, issues of law and fact."' 87
When the pool of joined defendants is largely limited to those contesting the
action on its substantive merits, they might realistically find it beneficial to
proceed as a group rather than as individuals.'88
Some may argue that the Doe defendants are not entitled to protection
because they willingly assumed the risk of adverse financial consequences
by engaging in infringing activities on the internet. True as this may be in
the abstract, it does not justify the procedural shortcuts taken by the plain-
tiffs in these cases. "[F]iling one mass action in order to identify hundreds
of [D]oe defendants through pre-service discovery and facilitate mass set-
tlement, is not what the joinder rules were established for."' 89 Moreover, the
Due Process Clause assures the John Does that they will not be called to
answer for their conduct in "a forum with which [they have] established no
meaningful 'contact, ties, or relations.' "190 These are protections that any
defendant is entitled to, regardless of their culpability. Without such protec-
tions, "the potential for coercing unjust settlements" from the John Does is
unacceptably high. '9'
Of course, the plaintiffs may argue that the minimum requirements stifle
their ability to "protect their copyrights in a cost-effective manner."'92 Yet, it
cannot seriously be contended that adherence to procedural rules should
take a backseat to cost-effective copyright enforcement. 93 On the contrary,
enforcing procedural rules "trumps [the plaintiffs'] interest in maintaining
low litigation costs.' 1 94 Plaintiffs have every right to enforce their copy-
rights, but procedurally deficient mass lawsuits that leave the implicated
defendants effectively unable to present their defenses and vulnerable to
187. London-Sire, 542 F Supp. 2d at 161.
188. See id. (noting that consolidating multiple defendants into one case would allow the
defendants to see the defenses other defendants have raised).
189. 10 Grp. v. Does 1-435, No. C 10-04382 SI, 2011 WL445043, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
3,2011).
190. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
191. K-Beech, Inc. v. John Does 1-41, No. V-I 1-46, 2012 WL 773683, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 8, 2012).
192. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 E Supp. 2d 332, 345 (D.D.C.
2011).
193. See 10 Grp., 2011 WL 445043, at *6 (noting a judicial reluctance to accept a plain-
tiff's motive of reducing litigation costs as sufficient to permit joinder in light of other
procedural difficulties); Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-11, No. 1:07-CV-2828, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90183, at * 17-18 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008) ("While Plaintiffs are certainly enti-
tled to vindicate their rights, they must play by the Federal Rules in doing so." (quoting Sony
BMG Music Entm't v. Does 1-5, No. CV 07-2434 SJO (JCx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Tele-Media Co. of W. Conn. v. Antidormi, 179 F.R.D. 75,
76 (D. Conn. 1998) ("Though the balance of pragmatic considerations may arguably point
toward permitting [joinder of defendants] ... the same transaction test of Rule 20 stands in the
way.").
194. K-Beech, 2012 WL 773683, at *5.
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predatory behavior by the plaintiffs and their attorneys are simply the wrong
tools for enforcement.
95
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately for copyright holders, the explosion of online piracy over
the past decade has made effective copyright enforcement increasingly diffi-
cult. However, the answer to this problem does not lie in mass copyright
infringement lawsuits that stretch permissive joinder beyond its recogniza-
ble scope and ignore due process limitations on personal jurisdiction. Yet,
lured by the prospect of extracting tens, hundreds, or even thousands of po-
tential settlements for the low cost of a single filing fee, many copyright
holders continue to file such lawsuits. All they need to access a multitude of
helpless defendants willing to settle without a fight is a judge willing to
grant expedited discovery. Often, that request is granted by a judge who is
either unaware of or indifferent to the fact that expedited discovery is the
last, not the first, step in the action. This Note argues that judges must rec-
ognize the fact that these lawsuits could never prevail in their current form
at trial because of their procedural defects. Since these suits will never go to
trial, expedited discovery is the proper juncture at which to enforce federal
procedural rules. This Note also advocates applying minimum requirements
that mass lawsuits should adhere to in order to protect defendants with well-
grounded procedural defenses. While the minimum requirements certainly
decrease the potential profitability of these lawsuits, profitability cannot be
achieved at the expense of established procedural rules. Should adherence to
procedural rules make copyright enforcement through mass litigation too
costly to be effective, perhaps the ineluctable conclusion is that mass litiga-
tion is not the proper vehicle for copyright enforcement.
195. See Bridy, supra note 31, at 724 ("Considering the significant procedural due pro-
cess and administration of justice issues associated with mass John Doe litigation, it is hard to
imagine a compelling argument in favor of adjudicating online copyright disputes this way.").
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